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Abstract:  Philosophers expend considerable effort on the analysis of concepts, but the value of such work is not 
widely appreciated.  This paper principally analyses some arguments, beliefs, and presuppositions about the 
nature of design and the relations between design and science common in the literature to illustrate this point, 
and to contribute to the foundations of design theory. 
 
Introduction 
Discussions in the design literature about the nature 
of design and the relations between design and 
science are in need of more rigourous conceptual 
analysis, not least because much can turn on the 
assumptions made about these matters.  It is the aim 
of this paper to briefly demonstrate the need for 
such analysis, and to indicate something of its value.  
This paper samples work in progress.  To begin, 
however, I discuss a case from the voluminous 
research in the behavioural science literature on 
crowding and the built environment, because it 
nicely illustrates the cognitive, pragmatic, and social 
costs of overlooking or failing to understand the 
need for such analysis. 
 
A Cautionary Tale 
In "Crowding Perceptions, Attitudes, and 
Consequences among the Chinese", Chalsa Loo and 
Paul Ong set out to test the seemingly common 
belief that, at least in residential settings, "the 
Chinese prefer crowding".1  Their research is largely 
barren, however, not to mention a waste of time and  
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money, and all for the want of a little time spent in 
the cool of the verandah sorting out the meanings of 
the crucial term 'crowding' and its cognates.2  
Instead, Loo and Ong dash into the field where an 
answer to their question is simply not to be had.  Let 
me explain. 
 
In ordinary English, 'crowding' and 'crowded' are 
typically value-laden words, or preference-laden or 
desire-laden words.3  So to say that crowding often 
occurs at the local bus stop after school or that my 
house is crowded when my relatives come to stay is 
not just to mean that such places are densely 
populated at these times - which meaning would not 
be value-laden or preference-laden.  It is typically to 
mean in addition that such densities are, to some 
degree, not desired or preferred - so far, at least, as 
the speaker is concerned.4 
 
So, Loo and Ong sampled residents of Chinese 
descent in San Francisco's Chinatown, a densely 
populated neighbourhood by North American 
standards, and asked them, amongst other things, to 
evaluate a crowded dwelling on a five-point scale 
from 'very good' to 'very bad'.5  Not surprisingly, 
94% of respondents thought that a crowded dwelling 
was " 'somewhat bad' or 'very bad' ".6  Since 
'crowded' means 'undesirably densely populated', 
however, it is not surprising that when people are 
asked, in effect, 'How desirable (or otherwise) is it 
that your dwelling should be undesirably densely 
populated?', they should respond that it is indeed not 
desirable. 
 
Further, Loo and Ong 'discovered' that everyone 
who reported being crowded in his or her dwelling 
also "felt the need for more space", which shows 
only that these respondents did not want to 
contradict themselves.7  Having judged that there 
was not sufficient space in their dwellings to satisfy 
their needs they agreed that more space was needed.  
And when asked whether or not crowding causes 
problems, 99% of all respondents thought that it did, 
which again is not surprising and shows only that (at 
least) 99% of their respondents understand the 
logical relations between the concepts 'crowding' 
and 'problem'.8  If one has an unsatisfied or 
frustrated need or desire of some importance it 
follows that one has a problem.  No empirical 
inquiry into this need is required to establish the 
existence of a problem. 
 
Other ambiguities in their use of 'crowding' and its 
cognates are common.  For example, they report that 
when asked whether or not their dwelling was 
crowded 1 in 5 of respondents who lived alone 
reported that it was.  In all probability, however, 
what such people meant was that their dwellings 
were cramped or confined.  But Loo and Ong decide 
that this response shows that crowding has an 
important "non-social component".9  On the 
contrary, all it shows is that 'crowded' is not 
univocal.  A dialogue about, for example, the 
financial attractiveness of investing in a bank does 
not have a geographical component because a 
question like, 'Is the bank a good place to leave 
one's money' can also be appropriate in a dialogue 
about going for a swim in the local creek. 
 
To sum up, a research grant and extensive 
interviews are not required to determine whether 
anybody likes crowding, any more than to determine 
whether some married men are bachelors.  
 
But there is also an important social implication of 
the conceptual mistake Loo and Ong have made.  
They seem to be aware that if the claim that the 
Chinese like crowding goes unchallenged then such 
people are at risk of being thought irrational or 
morally inferior beings.  How could someone like 
what is simply not likable or what no-one else 
decently likes?  Thus, Loo and Ong are worried, it 
seems to me, that this claim will breed racism, 
which is probably true. 
 
They approve of a remark, attributed to Jane Jacobs, 
that "every one hates crowding" (my emphasis), and 
suggest that this remark "reflects a perspective of 
cultural universality".10  Does the possibility of 
finding a human universal in respect of preferred 
densities appeal to Loo and Ong because it would 
deny racism a foothold?  I think so.  Jacobs' remark, 
however, is merely a semantic or logical truth, as 
should now be clear.  But it can seem to pick out a 
contingent truth that is universal for that very 
reason.  Just as the remark that it may or may not 
rain on the first Tuesday in November can seem to 
be informative about the weather on every such 
Tuesday, though in fact it tells us nothing about the 
weather on any such day. 
 
Since Loo and Ong conflate crowding with high 
density their research is not designed to bear on the 
possibility that preferences or tolerances in respect 
of density is causally related to culture.  Thus, they 
shy away from the interesting question whether their 
respondents might not regard as crowded densities 
which non-Chinese North Americans, who are 
otherwise relevantly similar, would so regard.  They 
do so because, given their conflation of crowding 
with high density, this question will appear to them 
to leave open the possibility that the Chinese like or 
tolerate crowding. 
 
For the same reason, Loo and Ong fail to interpret or 
understand some obvious evidence which others 
have provided that there is a causal relation between 
culture and density.  For example, they cite an 
interesting paper, "Some Chinese Methods of 
Dealing with Crowding", by the anthropologist 
E. N. Anderson Jr., who lived and worked in two 
Chinese communities in Malaysia.11  In this paper, 
Anderson details the mores and beliefs of these 
communities which led them to prefer or enabled 
them to cope with household densities greatly in 
excess of those which Anderson and most other 
North Americans would prefer or could even 
manage.12  (To ease the pressure of such densities, 
Anderson occasionally took solitary walks, which 
practice he discovered was "unheard of" amongst 
his hosts.  Such walks were "misconstrued" and the 
subject of "much speculation".13)  If Anderson's 
paper had been more accurately titled, "How some 
Chinese Identify or Deal with High Density Living", 
and key terms like 'crowding' replaced by 'high 
density' whenever the latter was meant, it would 
have been difficult for Loo and Ong to misconstrue 
Anderson's evidence that these high densities were 
freely chosen.14 
 
The way to combat the incidence or spread of the 
racism Loo and Ong rightly deplore is not by trying 
to show, having conflated high density with 
crowding, that 'The Chinese prefer crowding' is false 
because of how the Chinese happen to be.  That tack 
merely leaves the way open for the racist to exploit 
this conflation, finding evidence of Chinese 
communities who prefer or are indifferent to 
densities which members of the racist's audience 
would find crowded.      
 
The Act of Design (1) 
I turn now to the specific matters at hand.  In the 
design literature, such general questions as, 'What 
do we mean by "design"?', 'What is it to produce a 
design for something?', or 'What does the act of 
design consist of?' are usually passed over, or else 
receive a desultory treatment by authors anxious to 
move on to what they regard as the important 
questions about design.  This can easily be a 
mistake, as the analysis of 'crowding' above 
suggests, and two such cases are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
In How Designers Think, Bryan Lawson says that 
searching for a definition of 'design' is "probably 
much more important" than finding one.15  It is 
evidently not sufficiently important, however, to 
detain him, for he turns away to consider accounts 
of "the design process".  Lawson asserts that 
because design occurs in many areas and differs so 
much from one area to another, a definition of 
'design', such as that which he attributes to Chris 
Jones ("to effect change in man-made things"), 
would be "too general and abstract to be useful in 
helping us to understand design".16 
 
There is no substance to this objection, however, for 
if design is a feature of human activity generally, as 
Lawson (correctly) believes, then it is no fault of 
any such definition that it should try to capture this 
generality.  Lawson's argument is self–defeating for 
his aim is supposedly to understand design, not 
some species of design such as architectural or 
graphic design.  So it just is this general  feature of 
human activity that is the object of his concern.  
Similarly, where is the point in turning to models of 
"the design process"?  On Lawson's account, would 
not any such model likewise be too general or 
abstract to do justice to the differences between 
kinds of design.  Lawson also complains that when 
definitions of 'design' are provided they often betray 
the peculiarities of the area of design which their 
authors happen to practice or teach, overlooking his 
own chauvinism both in talking of design generally 
on the basis of examples drawn largely from 
architecture and in calling his book How Designers 
Think (my emphasis).17 
 
In "On not Getting it Wrong", Tom Heath likewise 
eschews a definition of 'design', preferring to tackle 
the question, 'Why do we design?'18  His answer 
reveals, however, that he thinks of design partly as a 
kind of simulation or rehearsal and partly as a kind 
of rethink.  But design cannot be the former and it 
need not involve the latter.  Heath says: 
Instead of simply doing something, we are going 
to do it in anticipation, so to speak; we are going 
to simulate what we are going to do before we 
actually do it.  Now we would surely not go to all 
this trouble if we believed that success was 
inevitable.  We do it because we fear that things 
will go wrong.  Our intended action is likely to 
fail, and it is to avert that failure that we plan or 
design.  Design seeks to stop things going badly. 
In this passage, Heath mistakes a simulation, 
rehearsal, or model of something, X, with a plan or 
design for X.  If I can simply go ahead and do or 
make X then X  has already been planned or 
designed (however badly), or no such planning or 
design is required.  A simulation, rehearsal, or 
model can itself be designed, of course; but the 
point is that in doing so one is not simulating a 
simulation or rehearsing a rehearsal. 
 
Moving on, in Method in Architecture, Heath's 
analysis is more thorough than Lawson provides, 
but his concept of design still has to be teased from 
the text.  At one point, he says, "the process of 
converting system information into form information 
just is the process of design".19  Elsewhere, however, 
he tells us that design constraints consist of 
information of these two types.20  But how can this 
be?  No process of thought or action can consist of 
converting one set of constraints on that process into 
another.  Heath adds the qualification that this 
process of information conversion is "more exactly, 
the end towards which design aims".21  But this is no 
help for the process by which X is achieved cannot 
be X.  Elsewhere, Heath says that a design can be 
"progressively matched" to this "information 
network" but we do not match a thing to itself.22 
 
This conceptual muddle seems to derive from a 
mistaken notion of what constitutes a design 
constraint and from the failure to distinguish 
information about different sorts of thing, namely, a 
form requirement and a possible form. 
 
Take, firstly, the notion of a design constraint.  
Broadbent states a seemingly plausible, no-nonsense 
approach to design constraints, for example, when 
he says that "before he starts designing, the architect 
must recognize that the real world will impose 
certain constraints on what he does.  The site is 
'there', solid."23  Now it is true that certain properties 
of the site, or information about those properties, 
will typically figure in the causal history of the 
architect's design constraints, but that is all.  
Consider the following example: suppose I falsely 
believe that a site is exposed to cooling summer 
breezes and protected from cold winter winds.  Now 
although there are no summer breezes my design 
will be constrained as if there were - given certain 
user requirements, my desire to satisfy those 
requirements, and my beliefs about certain 
properties of such breezes.  On the other hand, the 
fact that the site is wind-swept in winter will not 
constrain my design for I do not believe that this is 
the case.  In the final analysis, design constraints 
consist principally of such beliefs and desires on the 
part of the designer.  One can ask, of course, how 
those beliefs and desires are themselves formed or 
constrained, but that is another matter.24 
 
Secondly, recalling Heath's notion of the process of 
design as one which produces form information, he 
says of such information that it "consists of physical 
descriptions of objects".25  This statement is either 
vague or false.  A physical designer qua physical 
designer produces what she knows or supposes is a 
description of a physically possible object.  (Real 
estate agents describe extant physical objects, or at 
least that is what they would have us believe.)  
Heath's would-be example of such form information 
is, "The minimum clear dimensions for an operating 
room are 6m x 6m x 3m high" (my emphasis).26  
What Heath actually exemplifies here, however, is a 
form requirement - derived, one supposes, from the 
performance requirements for surgery - not the 
description of a possible form.27  This piece of 
information does not tell us how big any operating 
room is or is intended to be. 
 
To sort out Heath's muddle, then, we need to 
distinguish a possible form from a form 
requirement.  (The notion of information, moreover, 
is otiose in this context.)  Any form or performance 
(system?) requirement the designer adopts is a 
design constraint, one against which the design is or 
ought to be matched. 
 
The Act of Design (2)       
A cursory review of the literature for definitions of 
'design', or the concepts of design writers implicitly 
adopt, shows that they too often suffer from one or 
more of the following three defects. 
 
Firstly, definitions are typically too broad, or too 
narrow, or both.  For example, Jones's conclusion 
cited above that "the effect of designing is to initiate 
change in man-made things" is often taken as a 
definition of 'design' (though that was not his 
intention).28  It will not do as a definition of 'design', 
however, for it is both too broad and too narrow.  It 
is too broad because if I knock over the bedside 
lamp in my sleep I initiate a change in a (so-called) 
man-made thing though I have not designed 
anything; and it is too narrow because if I design 
something in my head, which I then forget or reject, 
no change in any man-made thing need be initiated. 
 
Secondly, definitions that are too narrow are often 
not of 'design' but of 'good design', or aspects 
thereof.  For example, in a detailed step-by-step 
analysis of "the nature of the act of designing", 
Bruce Archer last step is "selecting the optimum 
proposal".29  There is no place in a definition of 
'design', or in an account of what the design process 
or the act of design consists of, however, for such 
success or achievement assertions.  Archer even 
remarks that "no attempt is made here to define 
'good design' ", but his account is shot through with 
such success assertions.30  We must allow for failed 
or unsatisfactory designs rather than suggest that 
those who produced them were not thereby engaged 
in design.  If by 'design' we mean 'good design', then 
we cannot, on pain of contradiction, describe or 
condemn anything as bad design. 
 
Thirdly, one consequence of paying scant attention 
to the meaning, or rather meanings, of 'design' is 
that design as a cognitive activity is then easily 
conflated with design as a social or institutional 
practice, or profession.  Let us call such practices or 
professions, like architecture or engineering, 
'Design', to distinguish them from the cognitive 
activity.  Clearly, much design is done by people 
other than Designers, and Design consists of more 
than just design. 
 
One occasion when we especially need to be 
mindful of this distinction, as many are not, is in 
considering the relations between science and 
design (either sense).  This is because there is no 
equivalent distinction to be drawn in science; there 
is no cognitive activity called 'sciencing'.  So 
confusion is likely.  Thus, if someone says, 'Science 
is unlike design because it is descriptive whereas 
design is prescriptive', we need to ask what sense of 
'design' the speaker has in mind.31  For whilst 
Design is prescriptive design is not, as the next 
section makes plain. 
 
The Act of Design (3) 
Let me now spell out what it is for someone to 
formulate a design for something, so that we can 
glimpse the value of this enterprise.  (Some of it has 
already been deployed in the analysis of Heath's 
account.)  Someone, S, designs or formulates a 
design for some logically possible thing, A, (or type 
of thing, TA) at some time, t, just when, 
 (1) S imagines or describes A (or TA) at t; 
 (2) S supposes in (1) that A (or some token of 
  TA) would be such as to at least partially 
  satisfy some set of requirements, R, for A 
  (or TA) under some set of conditions, C; 
 (3) The partial satisfaction of R that S  
 supposes in (2) is a problem for which . . . 
 (4) . . . the solution candidate S imagines or 
  describes in (1) is novel or original for S at 
  t. 
 
These four conditions are: Description, Function, 
Problem-Solving, and Novelty/Originality.32  The 
purpose of (1) is obvious.  (2) removes day-
dreaming or idle thought.  (3) removes cases where 
S already knows or believes what satisfies what, and 
so no design is needed.  Design is typically a form 
of empirical inquiry.  (4) eliminates choosing from a 
range of pre-existing designs to solve a problem.  
Choosing a garden shed from a manufacturer's 
catalogue, for example, may comprise (1) to (3), but 
no shed is designed in this act.  (This act of 
choosing may, however, be part of some larger act 
of design, such as landscaping the garden or opening 
a new front in a cold war with one's neighbours.) 
 
At least three further points of explanation or 
clarification about this analysis are needed.  Firstly, 
the distinction between particular and type: some 
designs are designs for a particular thing, for 
example, an arrangement of freshly picked flowers.  
Further, only one arrangement of these flowers is 
possible at any one time.  Other designs are type 
designs, for example, the design of the Holden 
Commodore.  From this type, many tokens can be 
made -  all of which may exist at any one time and 
satisfy R.  Secondly, I have not specified that A (or 
that tokens of TA) should be physically possible, for 
we need to include such things as bridges that fall 
down, along with those that do not, for the former 
have nonetheless been designed.  And whilst there 
can be no perpetual motion machine, there can be 
designs for such a machine.  Thirdly, the design 
constraints discussed earlier consist of R and C. 
 
Finally, I remarked in the previous section that 
design was not prescriptive though Design was.  Let 
me now explain this point.  The set of conditions 
above for S to formulate a design for A, which I 
claim are necessary and sufficient, involves no act 
of commending or advocating or prescribing A (on 
the part of S or anyone else).  S may formulate 
several designs for A and reject all of them as 
unsatisfactory or inappropriate.  If designing were 
prescribing then, if S  did eventually prescribe a 
design for A, S would be prescribing a prescription.  
The practice of Design, however, is another matter.  
As a matter of historical fact, Designers do not 
present clients or users with every option they have 
considered and no advice as to which to select.  As 
with the medical practitioner's script, 'Take three 
times daily after meals . . . ', the prescriptive 
language of Design is evident in the working 
drawings, 'Fix battens at 300 centres . . . ' .   
 
Science and Design (1) 
I turn now to consider some relations between 
science and design relevant to this discussion.  A 
recurrent theme in the design method literature has 
been the concern to form a view of designing or of 
method in design by casting sideways glances at 
science.  But whereas it was once thought that 
design ought to be more like science, many now 
think that design just is not like science so the 
project was doomed from the start.  As I have 
indicated above, however, the distinction between 
design as cognitive activity and as social practice is 
usually overlooked or glossed over in this debate.  I 
shall explore some implications of this mistake 
below, but I begin with a salutary reminder about 
similarities and differences.  
 
Everything is like every other thing in some respect, 
and unlike every other thing in some respect.  I am 
like Margaret Thatcher, for example, in that there is 
only one of each of us, and I am unlike her in that 
she does not, to my knowledge, claim to bowl leg-
spin.  Thus, no argument in the above debate can 
turn on the mere enumeration of the similarities or 
differences between things, and it is no objection to 
any argument from analogy that the two things 
compared are unlike in some, indeed many, 
respects. 
 
So to begin, whilst astronomers or archaeologists 
are not Designers, it does not follow that they are 
not designers.  Much cognitive activity in science is 
or can be properly described as design.  I have in 
mind not merely the design of a piece of research or 
of an experiment, in respect of which the use of the 
word 'design' is indeed a commonplace, but also the 
formulation of theories or hypotheses.  It is quite 
appropriate to ask of, say, the various trans-Uranian 
hypotheses formulated by Leverrier and Adams 
what they were designed to do.  (The answer is that 
these hypotheses were designed to explain the 
residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus without 
generating any sensible perturbation in the orbits of 
the other known Jovian planets.)  Moreover, some 
practices that are ordinarily classified as science, 
such as the work of a team of scientists charged with 
genetically engineering a 'super pig' or finding a 
cure for AIDS, can equally well be described as a 
branch of Design.33   
 
In an influential passage in "The Logic of Design 
and the Question of Value", however, Lionel March 
says, 
Just as Popper draws a distinction between logic 
and empirical science, so too must a distinction be 
made between these and design.  To base design 
theory on inappropriate paradigms of logic and 
science is to make a bad mistake.  Logic has 
interests in abstract forms.  Science investigates 
extant forms.  Design initiates novel forms.  A 
scientific hypothesis is not the same thing as a 
design hypothesis . . . .  There has been much 
confusion over these matters, hence the illusions 
about scientifically testable design hypotheses . . . 
.34 
 
So the confusion remains.  In several places above, 
'design' is ambiguous.  Is "design theory", for 
example, the theory of the cognitive activity we call 
design or is it the theory of Design?  When medical 
science claims to have formulated a vaccine for 
AIDS, for example, will that vaccine not have been 
designed to prevent the onset of the disease (as well 
as, say, to have negligible side effects, not to be 
unstable or difficult to administer, and so on)?  
Where, then, is the line between March's "design 
hypothesis" and his "scientific hypothesis"?  The 
hypothesis, 'X is a vaccine for AIDS', will be called 
a scientific hypothesis because of certain 
institutional arrangements in our society, but that 
cuts no ice in the light of the above discussion. 
 
And whilst I take it we can agree that this 
hypothesis is "scientifically testable", why does 
March not think the same goes for the so-called 
design hypotheses, that is, the empirical claims, that 
are the stock–in–trade of the Design professions?  
The claim that a bridge built to some design, for 
example, will carry a certain load and deflect no 
more than a certain amount is so testable.  And so 
too is the claim that given certain social conditions, 
a tower block will lead to more dissatisfaction 
amongst residents or neighbours than a three story 
walk-up?   
 
Further, what of March's thumb-nail sketch of the 
allegedly crucial differences between logic, science, 
and Design?  What is more abstract than the point 
masses of Newtonian mechanics?  Which designer 
qua designer "investigates" no "extant form"?  
Which science "initiates" no "novel form", be it a 
particle accelerator or an AIDS vaccine?  How can 
'form' have the same referent for science and design 
in March's analysis when clearly Newtonian physics 
does not have to re-investigate the world because of 
the "novel forms" of the subsequent industrial 
society?  And so on. 
 
I carry no brief to 'scientise' design.  But it is 
important not to be misled by supposedly knock-
down arguments about the differences between the 
two practices and the cognitive work involved in 
each, when these arguments do not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
 
Science and Design (2)  
I conclude with more of the same, this time in 
relation to design method.  March and several others 
have also claimed that the Popperian view of 
science, whatever its merits, is "pernicious" or 
"untenable" in Design, again on the basis of certain 
alleged differences between the two practices.35  
Two reasons are given for this claim; both are false 
and neither is relevant. 
 
Firstly, it is said, correctly, that Popper denies there 
is induction or inductive reasoning in science.  "Yet 
in design", says March, "the chief mode of 
reasoning is inductive in tenor, that is to say, 
synthetic rather than analytic".36  But March misses 
the point, for Popper denies that there is induction 
tout court.  Thus, Popper would deny there is 
induction in design and so March would need to 
show that this latter denial is unwarranted.  
Induction is a feature of neither practice, if one 
believes Popper, or, like deduction, it is a feature of 
both; so no distinction between the two practices is 
to be found here.  Moreover, Popper does not deny 
that there is synthetic reasoning in science.  On the 
contrary, he says, 
[A] new theory should proceed from some . . . 
unifying idea about some connection or relation 
(such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto 
unconnected things (such as planets and apples) 
or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or 
new 'theoretical entities' (such as fields and 
particles).37 
 
Secondly, it is said, not quite correctly, that for 
Popper a good scientific hypothesis is one that is 
falsifiable.38  But "a good design hypothesis", 
protests March, "is chosen in the expectation that it 
will succeed, not fail".39  (Do March et al. seriously 
believe that anyone would hold that a good 
scientific hypothesis is chosen in the expectation 
that it will fail?)  The falsifiability criterion is a 
logical criterion.  Put simply, it is intended to divide 
hypotheses that can be inconsistent with observation 
statements from those that cannot.  There is no 
additional requirement that hypotheses of the former 
kind should as a matter of fact be false, or be chosen 
in the expectation that they are false.  'My dog is a 
labrador' is falsifiable, yet it may be true (whereas 
'My labrador is a dog' is unfalsifiable).  Popper does 
not suggest that veterinary science should prefer the 
view that my dog is, say, a poodle, on the ground 
that this belief would have the added advantage of 
being false!   
 
Contra March and others, the influence of Popper's 
thought on design theory has been largely 
beneficial.  It has consisted principally in the 
replacement of the false and debilitating 
analysis/synthesis model of design with the more 
accurate conjecture/test model, thanks to the 
intelligent reading of Popper's philosophy by Bill 
Hillier and others in their seminal paper, 
"Knowledge and Design".40  Popper's account of 
method in part grew out of his criticism of the 
traditional inductivist account of scientific method, 
which largely formed the basis of the 
analysis/synthesis model in design, whether we were 
aware of this or not.  Moreover, Popper's theory of 
method, in its most general form, is a theory of 
problem-solving by trial and error, a point which 
Popper himself makes abundantly clear.41  As such it 
applies equally to Design, or to trying to negotiate 
an arms embargo or sell a used car, as it does to 
science.42 
                                                           
* In Jim Plume, ed, Architectural Science and 
Design in Harmony: Proceedings of the joint 
ANZAScA / ADTRA conference, Sydney, 10-12 July, 
1990, pp. 229-38.  Kensington, NSW: University of 
NSW School of Architecture, 1991. 
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